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STATEMENT OFTHE ISSUES
Did the District Court err by granting summary judgment despite Mr. Robertson's
passing mention of Rule 56(f) in a paragraph of his Opposition to UCCU's Motion for
Summary Judgment?
Did material facts remain at issue when the District Court granted UCCU's Second
Motion for Summary Judgment?
Did the District Court err by holding Mr. Robertson had breached the credit
agreement?
Did the District Court err by ruling that Mr. Robertson either did not comply with
U.C.A. § 57-1 -31 or could not rely upon U.C.A. § 57-1 -31 to cure his defaults?
Did the District Court err by ruling that UCCU complied with notice requirements
set forth in the subject credit agreement?
Did the District Court deny Mr. Robertson due process or open access to the
Courts?
Should this Court grant UCCU's its attorney's fees incurred opposing this appeal?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A challenge to a summary judgment generally "presents for review only
conclusions of law because, by definition, cases decided on summary judgment do not
resolve factual disputes." Schurtz v. BMW of North America, 814 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah
1991). Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of law rather than fact, the
appellate court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal conclusions. Winegar v. Froerer
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Corp., 813 P.2d 104,107 (Utah 1991). The appellate court reviews those conclusions for
correctness, without according deference to the trial court. Country Oaks Condominium
Management Comm. v. Jones, 851 P.2d 640, 641 (Utah 1993); Allen v. Prudential
Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 800 (Utah 1992). This nondeferential
standard of review also applies to the threshold issue of whether there are no material
issues of fact such that summary judgment is in order,. Neiderhauser Builders & Dev.
Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah App.1992).
In the present case, Mr. Robertson's Appellate Brief not only challenges the
granting of summary judgment in favor of UCCU, but also claims that the District Court
denied a motion based upon Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. "[The
Supreme Court of Utah] has held that when a party timely presents an affidavit under rule
56(f) stating reasons why it is unable to proffer an evidentiary affidavit in opposition to
its opponent's motion for summary judgment, the trial court's discretion is invoked."
United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 893 (Utah 1993); see
also Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311, 312-13 (Utah 1984); Jones v. Bountiful City Corp.,
834 P.2d 556, 561 (Utah Ct.App.1992). Accordingly, the appellate court reviews a trial
court's decision to grant or deny a rule 56(f) motion under the abuse of discretion
standard. "Under this standard, [the appellate court] will not reverse unless the decision
exceeds the limits of reasonability." State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993)
(citations omitted); see also Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993).
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CONSTTTUTIONALAND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f)
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party
opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts
essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to
be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.
Utah Code Annotated § 57-1-31
§ 57-1-31. Trust deeds-Default in performance of obligations secured-ReinstatementCancellation of recorded notice of default
(1) Whenever all or a portion of the principal sum of any obligation secured by a trust
deed has, prior to the maturity date fixed in the obligation, become due or been declared
due by reason of a breach or default in the performance of any obligation secured by the
trust deed, including a default in the payment of interest or of any installment of principal,
or by reason of failure of the trustor to pay, in accordance with the terms of the trust deed,
taxes, assessments, premiums for insurance, or advances made by the beneficiary in
accordance with terms of the obligation or of the trust deed, the trustor or the trustor's
successor in interest in the trust property or any part of the trust property or any other
person having a subordinate lien or encumbrance of record on the trust property or any
beneficiary under a subordinate trust deed, at any time within three months of the filing
for record of notice of default under the trust deed, if the power of sale is to be exercised,
may pay to the beneficiary or the beneficiary's successor in interest the entire amount then
due under the terms of the trust deed (including costs and expenses actually incurred in
enforcing the terms of the obligation, or trust deed, and the trustee's and attorney's fees
actually incurred) other than that portion of the principal as would not then be due had no
default occurred, and thereby cure the existing default. After the beneficiary or
beneficiary's successor in interest has been paid and the default cured, the obligation and
trust deed shall be reinstated as if no acceleration had occurred.
(2) If the default is cured and the trust deed reinstated in the manner provided in
Subsection (1), and a reasonable fee is paid for cancellation, including the cost of
recording the cancellation of notice of default, the trustee shall execute, acknowledge, and
deliver a cancellation of the recorded notice of default under the trust deed; and any
trustee who refuses to execute and record this cancellation within 30 days is liable to the
person curing the default for all actual damages resulting from this refusal. A
reconveyance given by the trustee or the execution of a trustee's deed constitutes a
cancellation of a notice of default. Otherwise, a cancellation of a recorded notice of
7 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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default under a trust deed is, when acknowledged, entitled to be recorded and is sufficient
if made and executed by the trustee in substantially the following form:
Cancellation of Notice of Default
The undersigned hereby cancels the notice of default filed for record
(month\day\year), and recorded in Book
, Page
, Records of
County, (or filed of record
(month\day\year), with recorder's entry No.
,
County), Utah, which notice of default refers to the trust deed executed by
and
as trustors, in which
is named as beneficiary and
as trustee, and filed
for record
(month\day\year), and recorded in Book
, Page
, Records of
County, (or filed of record
(month\day\year), with recorder's entry No.
,
County), Utah.
(legal description)
Signature of Trustee
Utah Code Annotated §57-1-32
§ 57-1-32. Sale of trust property by trustee—Action to recover balance due upon
obligation for which trust deed was given as security—Collection of costs and attorney's
fees
At any time within three months after any sale of property under a trust deed as provided
in Sections 57-1-23, 57-1-24, and 57-1-27, an action may be commenced to recover the
balance due upon the obligation for which the trust deed was given as security, and in that
action the complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the indebtedness that was secured
by the trust deed, the amount for which the property was sold, and the fair market value of
the property at the date of sale. Before rendering judgment, the court shall find the fair
market value of the property at the date of sale. The court may not render judgment for
more than the amount by which the amount of the indebtedness with interest, costs, and
expenses of sale, including trustee's and attorney's fees, exceeds the fair market value of
the property as of the date of the sale. In any action brought under this section, the
prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred.

Utah Code Annotated § 78B-6-908
Attorney fees
(1) In all cases of foreclosure when an attorney's fee is claimed by the plaintiff, the
amount shall be fixed by the court. No other or greater amount shall be allowed or
decreed than the sum which shall appear by the evidence to be actually charged by and to
be paid to the attorney for the plaintiff.
8 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(2) If it shall appear that there is an agreement or understanding to divide the fees
between the plaintiff and his attorney, or between the attorney and any other person
except an attorney associated with him in the cause, the defendant shall only be ordered to
pay the amount to be retained by the attorney or attorneys.
Utah Constitution: Article I, Section 11
Courts open-Redress of injuries
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil
cause to which he is a party.
STATEMENT OFTHE CASE
In May of 2009, Mr. Robertson obtained a loanfromUCCU for the purchase of real property.
After closing and funding the loan, UCCU attempted to transfer the loan to Wells Fargo Bank. Wells
Fargo Bank discovered that the tax returns that Mr. Robertson had submittedtoUCCU were
substantially different than the tax relums that Mr. Robertson had ac^
Internal Revenue Code. Due to Mr. Robertson'sfraud,Wells Faigo Bank refusedtoreceive the loan.
Mr. Robertson's false representationstoUCCU during the loan application process were a clear breach
of the subject credit agreement In addition, Mr. Robertson failedtooccupy the home as his primary
residence in breach of the subject credit agreement. As Mr. Robertson's had breached the subject credit
agreement, UCCU demanded that Mr. Robertson cure his breaches of contract and UCCU elected to
accelerate the M balance of the loan. When he faHedtodo so, UC(X^fileda judicM foreclosure actioa
The District Court found that Robertson had breached the subject a M t agreement aM
property may be sold pursuanttothe judicial foreclosure statute.

9
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STATEMENT OFFACTS
On or near May 1,2009, Defendant Mike L. Robertson Sr. (hereinafter "Mr. Robertson" or
"Defendant') applied for a loanfromUtah Community Credit Union (hereinafter "UCCU" or
'Tlaintiff') to enable the purchase of real property located at 445 North 100 East, Spanish Fork,
Utah 84660 (the "Subject Property"). R548. At the time of the loan closing on May 28,2009,
Mr. Robertson signed a Deed of Trust which provided at paragraph 6 that Robertson (as
"Borrower") would occupy the property as his principal residence "unless extenuating
circumstances exist which are beyond [his] control." R547. The security agreement also
provided, in paragraph 8 that the Borrower would be in default if "materially false,
misleading, or inaccurate information or statements" were made during the application
process. Id. The loan closed, the funds were disbursed, £ind title to the Subject Property was
transferred to Mr. Robertson on May 28,2009. Id.
Several weeks later, when UCCU attempted to transfer the loan to Wells Fargo, it was
discovered that Robertson had filed actual tax returns with the Internal Revenue Service for the
years 2007 and 2008 that were not the same as the returns Robertson provided to UCCU when
he applied for the loan from UCCU. R546. Robertson now insists that he was never asked to
provide actual signed tax returns but that he elected, in this case, to provide financial
information on IRS forms to support the application. R545. In response to inquiries from
UCCU as to why Mr. Robertson had submitted inaccurate tax forms, Mr. Robertson sent a
letter to UCCU that is now pages 76-77 of the Appellate Record and is included in the
Addendum hereto. Before Mr. Robertson frilly contemplated that he was going to be
10 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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involved in litigation, he simply admitted that he adopted the practice of providing
lenders with false tax returns because lenders would not lend him sufficient funds when
he provided accurate tax returns. R76-77.
Counsel for UCCU sent a letter on June 26,2009, informing Robertson that because of
the inaccuracies regarding his income in the application process the obligation was in
default. R545. Mr. Robertson swears that because of the uncertainty generated by the
foreclosure and collection procedures he decided to not move into the home. Id. The home
was vacant for three months and then became occupied by Mr. Robertson's daughter; it has
never been occupied as a residence by Robertson. R545.
After the litigation ensued, UCCU filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on October
4,2010. R100-110. Mr. Robertson opposed the Motion For Summary Judgment. R278-298.
The District Court partially granted the Motion for Summary Judgment, holding that Mr.
Robertson breached the contract and was in default under the Deed of Trust because he provided
materially misleading information during the loan application process and because he has failed
to occupy the property within 60 days of closing. R543-44. The District Court also ruled that
the only possible reason for Robertson's use of the complete set of IRS forms was to mislead
UCCU to create the impression that Robertson's declaration of income corresponded to his
declaration of income to the federal government. R543. However, the District Court held
at that time that on the present state of the record, the Court was precludedfromawarding judgment
for the acceleration amount, together with costs and fees because formal compliance with the

11 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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notice requirements of paragraph 22 of the Deed of Trust was a necessary predicate to
acceleration of the debt to continue with foreclosure. R541.
UCCU filed a Second Motion for Summary Judgment on February 15,2011 for the
purpose of presenting the District Court with a more complete record that demonstrated that
UCCU had in fact complied with the notice requirements of the contract. R624-640. In
connection to that motion, UCCU attached a letter that counsel for UCCU had mailed to
Mr. Robertson and his attorney on June 24,2010, informing Mr. Robertson of his right to
cure. R605-606. Upon reviewing the said letter and the second affidavit of counsel for
UCCU, the District Court ruled that Mr. Robertson was provided adequate and sufficient notice
of the default and right to cure. R1020. The District Court granted UCCU's Second Motion
for Summary Judgment by executing an Order dated October 3,2011. R1012-1026
The District Court held that Mr. Robertson's loan was due and payable in full in the
amount of One Hundred and Fifty One Thousand Three Hundred and Eighty-Four Dollars
and Seventy-Three Cents ($151,384.73) as of May 24, 2010, plus interest thereafter at the
rate of 4.75% until paid in full, plus attorney's fees and costs incurred after April 5, 2011.
R1012.
Even though the litigation went on for 15 months at the District Court level, Mr.
Robertson never completed any discovery disclosures or sought any discovery from
UCCU. Both parties were in possession of a complete set of the loan application and
documentation, and both parties had a copy of the letter wherein Mr. Robertson openly
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admitted that he had adopted a practice of providing lenders with inaccurate tax returns so
that he could obtain the loans he believed he rightfully deserved.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Court did not fail to properly rule upon a Rule 56(f) Motion. Mr. Robertson
did not file a motion. Mr. Robertson simply inserted a reference to Rule 56(f) in his
Opposition to UCCU's first Motion For Summary Judgment and claimed that "[t]he
issues that needed to be ferreted out [were] many". In light of the absence of affidavits
complying with Rule 56(f) and in light of Mr. Robertson's admission that he adopted the
practice of providing lenders with false tax returns so that they would lend him money, it
was well within the boundaries of reason for the District Court to conclude that Mr.
Robertson had intentionally misled UCCU and that Mr. Robertson's mention of Rule
56(f) was entirely dilatory.
Mr. Robertson erroneously asserts in his Appellate Brief that the principal and
interest balance was still in dispute when the District Court granted final summary
judgment in favor of UCCU. However, the total amount owed was not disputed by Mr.
Robertson at the time that the District Court granted UCCU's Second Motion for
Summary Judgment. UCCU presented the Court with an affidavit setting forth the amount
owed, and Mr. Robertson did not dispute the affidavit.
When the Court granted UCCU's Motion for Summary Judgment, there was no
dispute regarding the fact that Mr. Robertson had provided inaccurate 1040s to UCCU
during the application process or that Mr. Robertson had not moved into the Subject
13 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Property. Mr. Robertson's breaches were clear violations of his contractual obligations.
The only issues before the District Court regarding the false representations and failure to
occupy were issues of contractual interpretation, not fact.
The District Court did not err in ruling that Mr. Robertson could not cure his defaults
under U.C.A. §57-1-31. Utah Code § 57-1 -31 is inapplicable to the present case, the defense
was moot by the time that Mr. Robertson raised it, and Mr. Robertson did not comply with
section even if it was applicable and timely
The District Court did not err in ruling that UCCU had given Mr. Robertson notice
required by the contract. Counsel for UCCU provided actual notice to Mr. Robertson and Mr.
Robertson's attorney. The notice was provided moretitian30 days before suit was filed and
the counting of time should be conducted as provided in the contract, not as the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure dictate for court filings that require service under the Rules.
The District Court did not err in dismissing Mr. Robertson's Counterclaim without
giving him his "day in court". The granting of summary judgment in this case by the District
Court did not violate either state or federal constitutional rights of Mr. Robertson by denying
him his "day in court." Mr. Robertson had full access to the Fourth District Court ofAppeals.
ARGUMENT
I. It was proper for the District Court to grant summary judgment despite
Mr. Robertson's passing mention of Rule 56(f) in a paragraph of his Opposition to
UCCU's Motion for Summary Judgment
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In his Appellate Brief, Mr. Robertson asserts that the District Court erred by
granting summary judgment despite a pending Rule 56(f) Motion. However, Mr.
Robertson did not file a motion. Mr. Robertson simply inserted a paragraph in his
Opposition to UCCU's first Motion For Summary Judgment that Mr. Robertson titled
"56(f)". R279. In that paragraph, Mr. Robertson asserted that "[t]he issues that needed to
be ferreted out are many." Id. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) provides:
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.
As stated in the "Standard of Review" section above, an Appellate Court reviews a trial
court's decision to grant or deny a rule 56(f) motion under the abuse of discretion
standard. The District Court's decision in the present case to grant summary judgment
was entirely within the limits of reasonability. Mr. Robertson did not file any affidavit in
support of his Rule 56(f) assertion. Mr. Robertson did attach an affidavit to his
Opposition to UCCU's Motion for Summary Judgment (R266-277), but Mr. Robertson's
affidavit contained absolutely no Rule 56(f) component in that it did not provide any
tangible or even colorable reason why Mr. Robertson was unable at that time to present
additional information or facts essential to justify his opposition. In fact, Mr. Robertson
proactively asserted a factual position in that affidavit and throughout this dispute -Mr.
Robertson asserted that he was never asked for nor provided any tax returns. R268; see
also, Mr. Robertson's Appellate Brief, line 7 page 21. Mr. Robertson contends that he
15 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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simply provided financial statements that happened to be on tax forms as opposed to
"signed and filed" tax returns. R275, f 9, 13. Mr. Robertson has never disputed that as
part of the application process he submitted the documents to UCCU that are now pages
22-34 of the Appellate Record. As the Court can plainly see, said pages of the Appellate
Record are 1040 tax forms. The Court can also see that the 2008 return is signed by Mr.
Robertson. Mr. Robertson would have this Court believe that Mr. Robertson submitted the
filled-out 1040 tax forms as mere income statements with no intent to deceive or defraud
UCCU even though he never provided a 56(f) affidavit claiming that he was asked for
"income statements" or that further discovery would show that UCCU asked him to
provide income statements and not tax returns.
When the District Court ruled on Plaintiff's First Motion for Summary Judgment
and found that Mr. Robertson did have intent to mislead and deceive UCCU, the District
Court had possession of the letter drafted by Mr. Robertson that is now pages 76-77 of the
Appellate Record. Mr. Robertson stated in an affidavit that he provided the said letter to
UCCU in response to inquiries from UCCU as to why Mr. Robertson had submitted the
subject 1040s for 2007 and 2008 that were different than the actual tax returns he had
filed with the Internal Revenue Service for those years. R273. It is also apparent on the
face of the letter that Mr. Robertson was replying to an inquiry by UCCU as to why Mr.
Robertson had provided the inaccurate 1040s during the application process. R76-77.
Before Mi*. Robertson fully contemplated that he was going to be involved in litigation he
simply outlined the truth in the letter and substantively admitted that he adopted the
16 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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practice of providing lenders with false tax returns because lenders would not lend him
sufficient funds when he provided accurate tax returns. R76-66. Mr. Robertson implies
in his Appellate Brief that the key question is whether UCCU had ever asked Mr.
Robertson for tax returns. Mr. Robertson doesn't want the Court to focus on the fact that
Mr. Robertson provided tax returns whether UCCU asked for them or not, leading the
District Court to find that:
"Robertson noted that before he adopted the practice of providing different
versions of tax returns to lenders and the IRS that he was not able to obtain the
credit he thought he deserved. He knew that the lenders expected tax returns. The
only possible reason for his use of the complete set of IRS forms was to mislead
the lender to create the impression that his declaration of income corresponded to
his declaration of income to the federal government."
R543-544.
Even if, in an attempt to view the facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Robertson, the
District Court accepted Mr. Robertson's claim that he had not been asked for tax returns,
it was entirely reasonable for the District Court to conclude that the evidence before the
District Court left no material fact in dispute and that Mr. Robertson had intentionally
misled UCCU.
Mr. Robertson's claim in his Appellate Brief that the Court never ruled on his Rule
56(f) Motion is simply untrue, as the only mention of Rule 56(f) by Mr. Robertson was
part of his Opposition to UCCU's Motion for Summary Judgment (R278-79) and the trial
Court issued a ruling detailing why it partially granted UCCU's Motion. R539-548.
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1 his Court has consistently held that a trial court need not ?rrmt ru;c '^. 1) motions

P.2d at 31243; Strand r. hstu i-iml St?**!* n/v - " «/;-.. -,;7 .'/'••
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afeo /ones, 834 P.2d al 5^1, Sandy City \. Sail Lake tuiuti), 794 P.2d 482, 488 (Utah
CtApp. 1990^ In the present case, Mr. Robertson could have presented an affida\ it
p:* ;. !• ^ .,..:.,!.-

• J--, i

, N-: a Miui. a Maiement on tax forms. Mr.

collaborate such a claim. By simply claiming repeatedly that he was not asked for tax
returns, however, Mr. Robertson did not identify for the District Court am v ^ ral K
reason why additional delay vumiu nave resulted in c\ iucike Uui a material iaa vi a> in
dispufi" Mi Ruber! son simpl> [.p-^t. -..

.

*: ,^

P- -H !!•

,. ...

for the District Court that his passive mention of Rule 56(f) was anything more than
dilatory.
'hi- \ .)i>ert>oi, also could have sought discovery in this case it he had any reason
to belie\ e that disco\ eiy w oi lid ha * ' e ii u lie w \\t x 1 that he j \? as asked foi "financial
statements" and that UCCU knew the iU4Us were not his actual tax returns. The parties
and attonieys for the parties communicated for several months before litigation was filed,
and both parties were in possession ui -\'i reic\ ant documentation because M•• <o^er^or

initiate any formal discovery during the 15 months between the time the G>r : UP •* •
filed and the time the Court granted final summary judgment. Not only did Mr. Robertson
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not seek to initiate any formal discovery, Mr. Robertson filed his own Motion for
Summary Judgment, which inherently took the position that no material facts remained in
dispute (R851-863). In many respects, the present case is factually similar to Crossland
Savings v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241. In Crossland, the Supreme Court of Utah found that
even though little time passed between the filing of the complaint and the granting of
summary judgment by the relevant district court, the case was relatively simple and the
defendant in the case had displayed an apparent lack of interest in discovery such that the
district court did not exceed the limits of reasonability when it concluded that the
defendant's Rule 56(f) motion was dilatory. The present case is also simple. Mr.
Robertson did not file any affidavit in support of his Rule 56(f) motion; the Fourth
District Court had Mr. Robertson's written admission that he had adopted a practice of
providing lenders with inaccurate information (R76-77); Mr. Robertson did not seek any
discovery; and Mr. Robertson's own motion for summary judgment inherently took the
position that no facts were in dispute. R851-863.
Even though counsel for Mr. Robertson and counsel for UCCU communicated
frequently about the case and shared any necessary information at will, Mr. Robertson
now claims that he was unable to proceed with discovery because the parties did not
complete initial disclosures. Mr. Robertson did not raise that proposition with the trial
court in any motion. "In order to preserve an issue for appeal the issue must be presented
to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue."
Pratt v Nelson, 2007 UT 41, 164 P.3d 366, 372-373. The Supreme Court of Utah has set
19 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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foi Ill three factors that help determine w hether the trial con; i liad such an opportunity: "

and (3) a party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal autiiorir\

" Id In

short, aparty ma> not claiir to have preserved an issue for appeal b\ "merely mentioning
... an issue without introducing supporting evidence or relevant legal authority," Id.

orderly procedure, the trial court ought to be given an opportun '

• u I d ivs

! ; M m ed

error and, if appropriate, correct i t ' " 1 -: : the present case, Mr. Robertson did not raise
the issue that initial disclosures were not made, therefore, it was not raised in ?. timeh or
specific fashion and w a s not i aised \ v itl i airy si.i -m <m. • JL:.ti .uu» * - i\
Though Mr. Robertson did not raise a Rule } N

-.

..?• '^ -^^-

-

mull

though he filed his own motion for summary judgment seeking to end the case, he now
proposes on page 15 of his Appellate Brief that the current version of ITtah Ri.V oT r'*.'!
Procedure 26 pi ecludedl ii.ii I ft om mo\ ing foi \ • ai d w ith discovery \\ .no link nib. esse
began, however, the previous version (-* :!. * I •!:•'-^ • .^

i:

•>•*'••.'•
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also made no effort to produce initial disclosures. 1 lie District Court simpi) d,d noi
commit err because A« Ir Robertson had admitted in writing what he had done and no facts
wen; in dispute
II- No material issues of fact remained when, the District 1 oml m anted
UCCU's Second Motion for Summary Judgment
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Mr. Robertson erroneously asserts that material issues of fact were still at issue
when the District Court granted final summary judgment in favor of UCCU. In particular,
pages 18 through 20 of Mr. Robertson's Appellate Brief assert that when the District
Court granted UCCU's Second Motion for Summary Judgment, the total dollar amount
that Mr. Robertson owed was still in dispute. However, the total amount owed was not
disputed by Mr. Robertson at the time that the District Court granted UCCU's Second
Motion for Summary Judgment.
On lines 14-16 of page 19 of Mr. Robertson's Appellate Brief, Mr. Robertson
quotes the District Court's ruling on UCCU's First Motion for Summary Judgment,
wherein the District Court found that Mr. Robertson had at that time disputed the balance
asserted by UCCU. R543. The paragraph of the District Court's ruling that is quoted by
Appellant is found on page 543 of the Appellate Record. At that time, Defendant had
claimed in his Opposition to UCCU's first motion for summary judgment that UCCU did
not have the right to accelerate the full debt. In the Statement of Undisputed Facts
contained in Plaintiff's Second Motion for Summary Judgment, UCCU asserted at
paragraph 16 that Defendant owed $145,102.08 in principal and interest as of February
11,2011. R637. The balance set forth in Paragraph 16 of UCCU's Second Motion for
Summary Judgment was supported by an affidavit of Jeff Meyers, UCCU's Vice President
of Real Estate Lending. R602-603. In Mr. Robertson's Opposition to UCCU's Second
Motion for Summary Judgment, Mr. Robertson responded to paragraph 16 of UCCU's
"Undisputed Facts" by saying only "Disputed. Plaintiff has not complied with the default
21
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provisions of the Deed of 1 rust. I neie i.u.-> Deen no proper notice,

KOVV.

Djiviidui;: *IK;

principal and interest amount was incorrect or in dispute, he only argued to th< DNt;*. :t
Court that UCCU still did not have the ability to accelerate.
In Jones v. Hinkle, 611 P.2d733 (1980), the Supreme Court ofUtah held that when a

specific evidentiary facts ^lt-'\\ r-> ;hi-^ ,;vis:i iicn'mi< <- . • -,; »•• ' - ,

:
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ikit

was proper in the present case and UCCU was entitled to judgment as a matter of law
because Mr. Robertson failed to identify with specificity any material fact.
Ill, I he District Court properly held Mr. Robertson had breached the credit
agreement
The Third and Fourth Sections of Mr. Robertson's Appellate Brief argue that the
District Court erred by finding that Mr. Robertson had breached the subject credit agreement.
1. he Disti ict Coin t found that Mi Robertson had breached the suoj v\; cicdn agreement m i)
making .. -< *vr *! ^i^vnu^^: 1 -^ >• !

- Tl J during the applicat ion pi ocess a rid 2

.-ng

to occupy the subject residence as Mr. Robertson's primary residence. R543.
A. Material misrepresentations to UCCII during the application process.
Defendant breached the contract ^ it! ll 'laintiffb) pro\ iding materially false,
misleading or inaccurate information, or In failing (opn,\ u\v nidleiiil mtonnatii >n Hie
Deed of Trust in the present action sets forth in section 8, page 6:
Borrower shall be in defai ill: if , di it ing the I -oai I application pi ocess, Bonxn ve r or
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any persons or entities acting at the direction of Borrower or with Borrower's
knowledge or consent gave materially false, misleading, or inaccurate information or
statements to Lender (or failed to provide Lender with material information) in
connection with the Loan.
R0015.
As set forth above, Mr. Robertson has contended throughout the litigation that he "was never
asked for nor provided any [tax returns]." R268; see also, Mr. Robertson's Appellate Brief,
line 7 page 21. Mr. Robertson contends that he simply provided financial statements that
happened to be on tax forms as opposed to what Mr. Robertson refers to as "signed and filed"
tax returns. R275, ^ 9,13. As set forth above, however, Mr. Robertson has never disputed
that he submitted the documents to UCCU that are now pages 22-34 of the Appellate Record.
Those documents are clearly 1040 tax forms. The tax returns that Defendant submitted to
Plaintiff represented that Defendant had made more than $ 100,000.00 each of the subject years,
but the actual tax returns that Plaintiff had submitted to the Internal Revenue Service reported
that Defendant had business income of less than $20,000.00 each of the subject years. R888.
After the loan had funded, UCCU attempted to transfer the servicing of the loan to Wells
Fargo Bank. Rl 09. Wells Fargo Bank spot audited the application and discovered what Mr.
Robertson had done. R108. UCCU was not aware that Mr. Robertson had provided false
tax returns to Plaintiff until after the loan had funded and until Wells Fargo Bank
discovered it. R105.
Mr. Robertson would have this Court believe that he submitted the filled-out 1040 tax
forms as mere income statements with no intent to deceive or defraud UCCU. However, Mr.
Robertson has never denied that he authored the letter that is now pages 76-77 of the
Appellate Record. Mr. Robertson admitted in the letter that he adopted the practice of
providing lenders with false tax returns because they would not lend him sufficient funds
when he provided actual tax returns. R76-77. Therefore, there was no material fact in
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dispute when the District Court found that Mr. Robertson breached Section 8 of the credit
agreement by providing materially false, misleading or inaccurate information, or by failing
to provide Lender with information he knew to be material. R541. It was clearly material to
the loan process that the tax returns Mr. Robertson submitted were not his actual tax returns.
Because Mr. Robertson had a contractual obligation to not pro\ ide I ICC I J \ v ith any
misleading information, Mr. Robertson had a contractual obligation to inform UCCIJ that the
1040s he submitted were not his filed tax returns arid did not acci u ately represent his tax
returns.
B. Failure of Mr. Robertson to occupy the Subject Property
Paragraph 6 of the subject Deed of Trust provides that:
"Borrower shall occupy, establish, and use the Property as Borrower's principal
residence within 60 days after the execution of this Security Instrument and sha!!
continue to oeeup\ the Property as Borrower's principal r ^ ; j eriee fo^ »• le^* :K
year after the date of occupancy"" (H 016»
UCCU asserted in its First Motion for Summary Judgment that Mr. Robertson breached
Paragraph 6 by failing to occupy the Subject Property within 60 days. (R10 ^ In his
Aj-wtjUU'h •.' *

VIK 1 !.* i-MII:^'*:••"

: '

.\:

old residence. Mr. Robertson has.iic\ or '^MT?CV1 that !

* i. :•; :\rt>o!i U. u.a rdo.: lis
• * a::n.r < iv*:^.

i n; .„• ,

rental property excused Mr. Robertson fro in occupying the Subject Property as his
primary residence. I he only argument that Mr. Robertson made to the Distrio! novv\ in his

Subject Property within 60 da> s w as 1 hat'I ICCI J conta.d < sd legal coi msel regarding Mi
Robertson's fraud and that the threat of litigation created great uncertainty that was
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"beyond his control." (R272). The District Court was correct in finding that even if the
threat of litigation worried Mr. Robertson, the mental wrangling presented no tangible
barrier to Mr. Robertson moving into the house.
The fact that Mr. Robertson has appealed the District Court's finding that he
breached the subject Deed of Trust by failing to occupy the home is inconsistent with
admissions that Mr. Robertson made to the District Court. Counsel for Mr. Robertson
stated during oral arguments before the District Court that:
"[Robertson] had a decision point when he decided to move his daughter in and
some of his stuff in, but not occupy [the subject home himself]. Those are decision
points and those things have consequences for [Mr. Robertson]. And the Court has
imposed the consequences of those decisions points on him, and fairly so."
(R1054,pgl2,lnl06).
No material fact was in dispute when the District Court concluded that Mr. Robertson
should not be excused from a contractual obligation due to uncertainty that he caused.
The only issue before the District Court regarding failure to occupy was one of
contractual interpretation, not fact. The District Court rightfully found that Mr.
Robertson's failure to move into the Subject Property was not beyond his control.
IV. The District Court did not err in ruling that Mr. Robertson could not cure his
defaults under U.C.A. § 57-1-31.
Defendant asserted to the District Court in opposition to UCCU's Second Motion for
Summary Judgment (and has now asserted in his Appellate Brief) that he cured any default
for fraud or failure to occupy the home. R695-697. He asserted that his breach was cured
when he availed himself of rights provided in Utah Code § 57-1-31(1). Utah Code Section
25
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5n 1-31(1) provides that:
(1) Whenever all or a portion of the principal sum of any obligation secured by a trust
deed has, prior to the maturity date fixed in the obligation, become due or been
declared due by reason of a breach or default in the performance of any obligation
secured by the trust deed, including a default in the payment of interest or of any
installment of principal, or by reason of failure of the trustor to pay, in accordance
with the terms of the trust deed, taxes, assessments, premiums for insurance, or
advances made by the beneficiary in accordance with terms of the obligation or of the
trust deed, the trustor or the trustor's successor in interest in the trust property or any
part of the trust property or nn\ other per^vi having a subordinate lien or
encumbrance of record on the trust property or an> beneficiary under a subordinate
trust deed, at any time within three months of the filing for record of notice of default
under the trust deed, if the power of sale is to be exercised, may pay to the beneficiary
or the beneficiary's successor in interest the entire amount then due under the terms of
the trust deed (including costs and expenses actually incurred in enforcing the terms
of the obligation. \ M trust deed, and the trustee's and attorney's lees actually incurred)
other than that portion of the principai as would i:;»i then he due 1 A ' n< default
occurred, and therehv eure the existing default. A Iter the beneficiary or beneficiary's
successor in interest has been paid and the default cured, the obligation and trust deed
shall be reinstated as i r po iccelenition had <XYUP\V
At 'the time that Mr. Robert-^p ~,n\v d •- .:.. • " ; -"

, »< >sit i< >n I < ) I JCC I J's Sec ond

Motion for Summary Judgment, the District Court had already decided in its December 6,
201(1 Memorandum Decision (parfmlK granting lUVU's hrsi Mntmn h i Summary
Judgment) that Defendant was in default. R.541 Mr. R obertson did not raise Section 57-13.

.i.^ Answer or in opposition lu > ; i . > ] HM \U ; *>n N-r Sunimaiy Judgment, R278-

298. The NSLK- <>*' liability was moot when Defendant first raised ?!v iw

- i-

* •,

subsequent Moiioi. I-M' Summary Judgment and in his Opposition to Plaintiff's Second
Motion for Summary Judgment Mr, ls'oherNon\ filings regarding the meaning of Section s "11-31 amounted to an impermissible motion to reconsider.
E'- en f aii> i irgumei it 1 )ased oi I I Jl ; ih Code \ n nol i tted § 5 7 • 1 31 was not moot when
raised by Defendant, Utah Code §57-1-31 u as m »j applicable to the present matter. Utah
26
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Code sections 57-1-23 through 57-1-32 relate to the non-judicial foreclosures of trust deeds.
The property in the present case was foreclosed judicially in the manner permitted for
mortgages. R758. The proper portion of the Code that governs this case is Title 78B,
Section 6, Part 9. Defendant acknowledged Title 78B of the Utah Code when it suited him;
Defendant acknowledged Section 78B-6-908 when he argued that Plaintiff's attorney's fees
should be limited in the present case. R698. Utah Code Annotated Section 57-1-31 applies
when attorneys are overseeing non-judicial foreclosure, but the Courts of Utah are not
rendered powerless to rectify fraud and failure to occupy a primary residence simply because
a defendant makes monthly payments that are less than the accelerated amount due and that
do not address the underlying problem. If Defendant's position were the law, courts would be
powerless to provide relief in any mortgage fraud case if the defendant simply makes
payments. Surely, Defendant's position is not the public policy adopted or intended by the
Utah Legislature. Indeed, it was within the District Court's discretion to find that "Perhaps
the only possible cure was immediate repayment of all sums borrowed." R541.
Even if Defendant's argument regarding having cured under Utah Code Annotated §
57-1-31 has not been mooted or is not inapplicable as set forth above, Section 57-1-31 clearly
does not apply to non-financial defaults. The first line of the Section expressly refers to the
"sum of any obligation". The word obligation refers to financial sums or financial amounts
owed. The present case has been brought because of Defendant's false representations and
his lack of occupying the subject residence as his primary residence. When delineating what
defaults can be cured pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 57-1-31, the Utah legislature
expressly delineated that it included "a default in the payment of interest or of any
installment of principal, or by reason of failure of the trustor to pay, in accordance with the
27
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terms of the obligation or ••. the trust weed

.emphasis adik-

:ieiv:^c. tiu. piaui

Even if Utah Code § 57-1 o I was not moot when raised by Defendant or inapplicable
tothepresentjudicial Ksr.^-^uu'. i-Jcic:tua. i. .-.\ .;ui.;u\i

••:•.. • KK a:--'

p*

-;:s.

Defendant did not otherwise comply with the Section by paying all of the attorneys fees,
costs and expenses incurred, rherefore, the District did not err in i Hiding that \; t. K-. ^oertson
(<» ^•m-ra^^'tv S(.u(.;- • . ^'r::,/

/ J . •,:;- o *Mw-.* w ith the Section even 11 it was

applicable.

IMl!l££-E£M,I!,l! '"! I by the contract.
Mr. Robertson asserts in his Appellate Brief that there are two reasons for finding
liuii the District Court erred when it found r.Y:; I •. I had satisfied paragraph o *>i ^r

notice to the proper attorney, and 2) "UCCU did not give notice a full 30 days before filing
suit
A. UCCU gave notice more than 30 days before filing suit
1 he second assertion h] • I" « li R obertsonv^ as nev er raised at the District Com t I'\ li
Robertson never argued to the District Court that H\ ^prlv^: "rn>ner counting" of time
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, UCCU did not give a full 30 days of notice to
Mr. Robertson of its intern n • tile suit. As set forth above, an issue must be preserved at
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from raising the issue for the first time on appeal when he failed to preserve the argument
at the District Court.
Even if Mr. Robertson had raised the argument at the District Court, the affidavit
of counsel for UCCU that is part of the record indicates that the subject notice was mailed
on May 24, 2010. R608. Mr. Robertson proffers to the Court that the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure dictate that the counting of days should not include three days for mailing,
weekends, or holidays. However, the Deed of Trust was a contract, not a Court filing
requiring service of process. The Contract provides at paragraph 15 that "Any notice to
Borrower in connection with this Security Instrument shall be deemed to have been given
to Borrower when mailed by first class mail or when actually delivered to Borrower's
notice address if sent by other means." R89-90. Therefore, the 30 days began when the
letter was mailed and the only affidavit in this case that even mentions the letter (an
affidavit of counsel for UCCU), provides that the letter was mailed on May 24, 2010.
R608. Suit was filed on June 25, more than 30 days after giving the notice.
B. Notice was properly given to counsel for Mr, Robertson.
Mr. Robertson asserts in his Appellate Brief that the District Court erred by finding
that Mr. Robertson had received adequate notice from UCCU of his right to cure before
UCCU could file suit pursuant to the credit agreement. Defendant asserts notice was not
proper because counsel for UCCU mailed the notice (R691-695) to the property that is the
subject of this litigation (the property Mr. Robertson failed to occupy). Mr. Robertson
claims that the subject property was not the proper address for notice because he had
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designated in writing that a different address should have been used Id. However,
paragraph 25 of the Deed of I r list expressly provides that "Borrower requests viat ^pies
of the notices of defai ill; and sale be sent to Bon owei 's address w hich is the I h open: I y
Address." R086. Page 2 of the Deed of Trust defines the term "Property Address" as the
property that was purchased with the loan proceeds (the property Mr, Robertson failed to
occupy). R94. Paragraph - • o: ;;.*.- ix.^. I i »u.si is more specific than paragraph i * o]

as was done by counsel for UCCU.
Furthermore, when counsel for UCCU first contacted Mr. Robertson to demand
payment in the present case, Mr. Robertson replied with a letter P'74-'7^ MR obertson's own lettei designated

s
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.p

wasusedby Mr. Robertson to send the u tv* •! -, d^h nated the Subje* •> Pu*.\ :\ ,<.
Robertson's return address. Id. In addition, Mr. Robertson was repl>ing to a Jc*nana
letter sent by counsel for Plaintiff to the subject property. R n 47.
•• •

•-;',-'

! s--: i • unr.pi> '.\n:i ::.v. ,.\\i; • • Srust and reply to the

address Mr. R obertson was expressly using to communicate, Mr. Robertson received actual
notice. At the iJistnct ( oun. Dcieiklain uiJ no\ dcn\ Miat he received the letter at issue;
Defendant only claimed that the letter was not served a the ' 1 e ^ r aiKiros-

Kfrr:

^

Defendant provides no case law in support of the proposMion that "leeal ?--\:e" h nor
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parties, "Well accepted rules of contract interpretation require that i the (\uirtl examine tiv
languag'e of the c 01 i1 i i ict to determine meaning and intent/" t ate Kf >;u. e / <^v . n-i nv* >/w30
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Overton, LLC, 2009 UT 27, paragraph 25. At the time of contracting with each other, the
parties intended that Mr. Robertson would be notified of how he could cure a given default
and of the 30 day deadline by which he had to do so. The Supreme Court of Utah has
repeatedly recognized that:
117 The underlying purpose in construing or interpreting a contract is to ascertain the
intentions of the parties to the contract. Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA, 2002 UT 42, ^ 9,
48 P.3d 941; SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback & Assocs., Inc.,
2001 UT 54, f 14, 28 P.3d 669. " 'In interpreting a contract, the intentions of the
parties are controlling.' " Dixon v. Pro Image, Inc., 1999 UT 89, f 13, 987 P.2d 48
(quoting Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991)); see also
Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, \ 18, 48 P.3d 918.
In the present case, Mr. Robertson was given notice of how he could cure the contract and the
deadline by which he had to do so; the intention of the parties was clearly met. Additionally,
Utah appellate courts recognize that a party receives notice for contractual purposes when he
receives actual notice even if the notice is sent to an address other than the address specified
in an agreement. In the Utah case of Chrysler Dodge Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Curley, the
defendant argued that she had not received adequate notice of a repossession sale of her
vehicle because the notice in that case was sent to the home of her family member. 782 P.2d
536. The case indicates that "[a] person "receives" a notice or notification when: (a) it
comes to his attention; or (b) it is duly delivered at the place of business through which the
contract was made or at any other place held out by him as the place for receipt of such
communications." 782 P.2d 536 (1989) at page 539-540 (emphasis added). The Utah Court
of Appeals found in Curley that the defendant had received sufficient notice. In the present
case, not only did paragraph 25 of the Deed of Trust require counsel for Plaintiff to mail the
notice to the subject property, sending the notice to that property was not a material breach
because Defendant had held the property out as a place of receipt of communication.
31
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Not onl;> did Mr. Robertson receive the letter at issue in the present case, Mr.

appeal that the notice w as not proper because it was received by Richard D. Bradford rather
tin-

!

- •-:

! "u

:--!tnci i'uMMer M J .i-::C> nrau\. i u vaojcct iirrn was once Bradford and

Brady, PC, but Mr. Brady was appointed as a Fourth District Judge and left the practice. Not
only has Mi •*: jdiwrcl ionic 10 the office of counsel for UCCU and called counsel for UCCU
several times before the nol icew as sei i1 to his; il tentionj :n il I Ii Bi ad] indicate! linw ritingto
UCCU that Mr. Bradford w ds e»> counsel before Mr. Brad\ left the practice. Vr ktter at
P - M • - ••

* •

4

-

',

In
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...iv.nes

that Mr. Bradford was representing Mr. Robertson at the; time that the notice from UCCU was
mailed on May 24 ,2010
"[A]n attorney is the agenioitlie client and knowledge*- n

;

iv;vm

i n^ - ^,H1

bythe attorney is imputed to the client." Von I lake v. Ihomus 858P.2d 1^3. 1^-4 n. x (Utah

case, Mr. Robertson was imputed to have received the notice \ 1 r R (*bertson recei \ ed notice
iiiiireN^ u-qup.eu »•;. i\i.:..^i,i;"Ji. -

'-

•.. -

j

J ust. received notice u! the address

that lie had used TO e< Mnmunicate with counsel for Plaintiff (which address Mr. Robertson hnd
pronii>cd to uutKv- I-,;N pi imary residence), and received notice at the office of h^ attorik \ It
is frivolous for Mr. Robertson to continue argi ling that he did not i ecei\ e "legal"' notice.
VI. The District Court did not err in dismissing Mr. Robertson's Counterclaim
without giving him his "day in court".
The first portion of the final secti :)ii of IS l"i R obei tson's Appellate Brief makes the
same substantive argument as the first section of the Brief- i.e., that the Court should ha\ e
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allowed more discovery before final rulings were issued in this case. As this Court already
has UCCU's response set forth above, UCCU will not fully restate the argument made above.
UCCU does request that this Court take notice that the final section of Mr. Robertson's Brief
does not cite a single fact that remained in dispute or that would have been better understood
through more discovery. Nor does that section state what err the District Court may have
made in connection to any federal or state statute.
The final section of Mr. Robertson's Appellate Brief, set forth on pages 36 and 37
thereof, asserts that the granting of summary judgment in this case violated either state or
federal constitutional rights of Mr. Robertson by denying him his "day in court." Inherent
within Mr. Robertson's argument is the proposition that a court can never grant summary
judgment, that a court must always permit a case to go to trial. Mr. Robertson ignores the fact
that oral arguments were held in this matter. Mi*. Robertson proposes, or at least implies, that
Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796 (Utah 1998), supports the proposition that the Constitution
guarantees him a "day in court" other than the day he and his counsel already spent in court.
The Jenkins ruling considers mandatory arbitration clauses in contracts; there is certainly no
portion of the Jenkins ruling that can be interpreted to mean that a district court cannot grant
summary judgment, even if oral arguments are not held as they were in this case. Likewise,
the other cases cited by Mr. Robertson do not support the proposition that a district court may
not grant summary judgment.
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution provides:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred
from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or
counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
33
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In the present matter, both parties have had complete access to the District Court, and
neither party has been barred from seeking remedies through it.
VII. UCCU respectfully requests that this Court grant its attorney's fees
incurred opposing this appeal.
UCCU respectfully requests that this Court order Mr. Robertson to pay UCCU's
attorney's fees incurred in the course of researching, drafting this brief, and any oral
arguments that may occur. The District Court in this matter awarded UCCU all attorney's fees
it incurred at the District level. R1012. Attorney's fees are also awardable pursuant to the
credit agreement and Utah Code § 78B-6-908(l).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, UCCU respectfully requests that this Court deny Mr.
Robertson's appeal in its entirety and affirm the rulings of the District Court in their entirety.
DATED this 9th day of April, 2012.
HANSEN WRIGHTEDDY& HAWS, P.C.

PAULD.JAR^fS
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that I personally mailed two true and correct copies of the forgoing
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Mike L. Robertson. Sr., Appellant
445 North 100 East
Spanish Fork, UT 84660
Mike L. Robertson, Sr., Appellant
444 W Center Street
Provo,UT 84601

Secretary/Paralegal
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Certificate of Compliance with Rule 24(f)(1)
This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Utah R. App. R24(f)(l) because:
1. it contains 9,199 words, excluding the parts of the Brief exempted by Utah R. App.
P.24(f)(l)(B); and
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13 pt., Times New Roman font.
Dated: 9 April 2012
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ADDENDUM
U t a h R u l e s o f Civil P r o c e d u r e , Rule 5 6
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to
obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse
party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party, A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted
or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary judgment as to all or
any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in
accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered
on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered
upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of
the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel,
shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what
material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order
specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the
amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in
the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible
in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters
stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit
shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented
or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file such a
response.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing
the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify
the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had
or may make such other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party
presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing
of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney
may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
[Amended effective November 1,1997; November 1, 2004.]
Utah R. Civ. P. 56
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U.C.A. 1953 § 57-1-32
§ 57-1-32. Sale of trust property by trustee—Action to recover balance due upon obligation
for which trust deed was given as security—Collection of costs and attorney's fees
At any time within three months after any sale of property under a trust deed as provided in
Sections 57-1-23, 57-1-24, and 57-1-27, an action may be commenced to recover the balance due
upon the obligation for which the trust deed was given as security, and in that action the
complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the indebtedness that was secured by the trust deed,
the amount for which the property was sold, and the fair market value of the property at the date
of sale. Before rendering judgment, the court shall find the fair market value of the property at
the date of sale. The court may not render judgment for more than the amount by which the
amount of the indebtedness with interest, costs, and expenses of sale, including trustee's and
attorney's fees, exceeds the fair market value of the property as of the date of the sale. In any
action brought under this section, the prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its costs and
reasonable attorney fees incurred.

Credits
Laws 1961, c. 181, § 14; Laws 1985, c. 68, § 4; Laws 2001, c. 236, § 13, eff. April 30, 2001.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

39

U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-6-908
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-37-9
§ 78B-6-908. Attorney fees

(1) In all cases of foreclosure when an attorneys fee is claimed by the plaintiff, the amount shall
be fixed by the court. No other or greater amount shall be allowed or decreed than the sum which
shall appear by the evidence to be actually charged by and to be paid to the attorney for the
plaintiff.
(2) If it shall appear that there is an agreement or understanding to divide the fees between the
plaintiff and his attorney, or between the attorney and any other person except an attorney
associated with him in the cause, the defendant shall only be ordered to pay the amount to be
retained by the attorney or attorneys.
Credits

Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1004, eff. Feb. 7, 2008.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-908 (West)
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An

Kevin has asked that I give an explanation oh the differences in tax returns.
Before 1 begin, let me stress that the forms ybu have reflect an honest, true, and accurate
reflection of the income that I receive.
j
Now for the explanation.

• j

Over 25 years ago, we found that as a business there were several very major and legal
means to reduce the income we received for jtax purposes. And we set out to use all that
were available to us. But this created several! problems as well
One, I am in the habit of not only giving a fujll 10% tithe to our church, but I am also very
generous in other areas like missionary, humanitarian aid, and education funds. These
usually amount to about 19-20% of my gross income before any deductions or means of
tax reduction. These by themselves could caiise a tax audit even if there were no other
deductions.
j
But, to make it worse, by taking full advantage of all the means available by law, we
ended up with it showing more in the 50% tq 60% range and that did trigger an audit
every year for a number of years. Each time, j the IRS came in and looked at our figures
and in the end agreed that we were in compliance with their code and that no taxes were
due. But it took a great deal of time and frustration on our part to do this. At that time, we
decided that a better method would be for us;to do the complete return and then take the
finalfiguresand submit those on a simple form. Again, in full compliance, but just not in
a way that triggered an audit every year. 3mete filing this way, we have not had a single
audit. But, if we did, we can show the exact imounts we did bring in., the deductions
allowed by law we take, and for what purpose, and we end up with the exact same figures
in the net results. It just does not bring up thej continual red flags.
Then, that brought up other problems. Even though we were making a great deal of
money, we did not have tax returns that showed the actual income. And even if we took
the long forms, they too appeared that with all the business expenses that we were not
making very much money. We were then unable to get any credit with local banks. We
fought with this for years. Wc tried to show tjhat we were indeed making money, but that
it was used in ways that we could show a deduction instead of a profit. Banker after
banker said they were sorry, but they had to go with the net amounts on our returns.
Maybe we are wrong, but we started doing the returns with the honest, true, and accurate
amounts based on the 10% of gross income tjiat I pay as a tithe. Then we show the basic
deductions of normal expenses used to get us to that point. We did not show the other tax
write offe that bring us down to the point where we show little income. From that point
on, we have been able to get the credit we deserve with our local banks. I am sorry that
this has caused a problem in this case.
i
ftl
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Let me stress that the papers you have do in jfact show a true portrayal of the actual take
home income that I take. They are not inflated in any way. They are what I have as an
income.
!
Now, if you want a well performing loan that will be paid on time each and every month
without problems, 1 promise that this will bq it. I promise that it will be paid on the first
day of each month, without fail In full. You! will never have a problem with this loan
because of lack of payment.
j
But, if the paperwork causes a problem, and jyou do not wish for me to proceed, let me
know and I will transfer it to someone else who knows that I will pay my obligations on
time without fail.
Sincerely,

Mike Robertson

6-/6 r*?
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FILED
JUN 6 2011
4TH DISTRICT
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

t

UTAH COMMUNITY CREDIT UNION,
Plaintiff,

:

Memorandum Decision

vs.

:

Date: June 1,2011

MIKE L. ROBERTSON, SR.,

:

Case No.: 100402192

:

Division VII: Judge James R. Taylor

Defendant.

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs Second Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Plaintiff (hereinafter "UCCU") has asked for summary judgment 1) dismissing the
Defendant's Counterclaim with prejudice and 2) ruling that UCCU has complied with paragraph
22 of the Deed of Trust so that UCCU may proceed with foreclosure of the subject property.
Undisputed Facts
From a careful consideration of the submissions and affidavits the Court finds that some
facts are not capable of reasonable dispute. On or near the first of May, 2009 Robertson applied
for a loan from UCCU to enable the purchase of real property including a home in Spanish Fork.
In support of the "Uniform Residential Loan Application," Robertson provided income
information, disclosing an adjusted gross income in 2007 of $126,168 and in 2008 of $109,920.
The Deed of Trust provided in paragraph 6 that Robertson would occupy the property as his
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principal residence "unless extenuating circumstances exist which are beyond Borrower's
control." The Deed of Trust also provided in paragraph 8 that Robertson would be in default if
"materially false, misleading, or inaccurate information or statements" were made during the
application process. The scope of paragraph 8 explicitly but not exclusively included statements
relating to intended occupancy of the property. It was disclosed and Robertson understood that
at the time of closing, UCCU intended to sell servicing rights to the account to Wells Fargo,
effective July 29, 2009. The loan closed, the funds were disbursed, and title to the property
subject to the Deed of Trust and Trust Deed Note was transferred to Robertson on May 28, 2009.
Several weeks later during the transfer process to Wells Fargo it was discovered that
Robertson had filed actual tax returns for the years 2007 and 2008 that were not the same as the
returns provided during the loan application. In those returns he declared a gross income of less
than $20,000 for each year. Robertson explained to an agent of UCCU that he had some time
earlier adopted a business strategy of declaring less than his actual income to the Internal
Revenue Service to avoid audits regularly triggered when he declared his full income but took
advantage of legitimate deductions to reduce his taxable income. Unsatisfied with Robertson's
explanation, UCCU referred the matter to counsel. Counsel notified Robertson in a letter dated
June 26,2009 that the obligation was being accelerated and considered in default because of the
inaccuracies regarding his income in the application process. Robertson swears that because of
the uncertainty generated by the foreclosure and collection procedures he decided not to move
Page 2 of 13
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into the home. It was vacant for three months and then became occupied by Robertson's
daughter. It has never been occupied as a residence by Robertson.
UCCU filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to allow entry of a money judgment for the
balance due under the Trust Deed Note. UCCU could then proceed with sale of the property to
apply the proceeds to the obligation and seek an appropriate deficiency judgment if necessary.
In its Memorandum Decision dated December 6, 2010 this Court found Robertson in default
under the Deed of Trust because he provided materially misleading information during the loan
application process and because he has failed to occupy the property within 60 days of closing.
However, this Court denied UCCU's request for immediate judgment and authorization to
continue with the trustee's sale because UCCU failed to demonstrate compliance with the
contract requirement for acceleration of the balance due.
Legal Standard
Summary judgment "shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Additionally, "the facts and all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom [are viewed] in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Jackson v.
Mateus, 70 P.3d 78, 80 (Utah 2003) (internal citations omitted). Summary judgment "denies the
opportunity of trial [and so] should be granted only when it clearly appears that there is no
Page 3 of
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reasonable probability the party moved against could prevail." Utah State Univ. of Agric.
Applied Sci. v. Sutro & Co.. 646 P.2d 715, 720 n.14 (Utah 1982).
Furthermore, "it is inappropriate for courts to weigh disputed material facts in ruling on a
summary judgment. It matters not that the evidence on one side may appear to be strong or even
compelling. One sworn statement under oath is all that is needed to dispute the averments on the
other side of the controversy and create and issue of fact, precluding the entry of summary
judgment." Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)
(internal citations omitted).
This Court will first address the notice requirements of the Deed of Trust and
Robertson's alleged cure of the default. The Court will then examine each cause of action that
Robertson asserted in his counterclaim in light of the Court's findings on these preliminary
issues. Finally, the Court will address the issue of attorney's fees.
Notice Requirements of Paragraph 22 of the Deed of Trust
Paragraph 22 of the Deed of Trust provides a very specific process that must be followed
prior to acceleration following a breach of any covenant by the Robertson. Notice of a breach
must specify: "(a) the default; (b) the action required to cure the default; (c) a date, not less than
30 days from the date the notice. .. by which the default must be cured; and (d) that failure to
cure the default will result in acceleration of the sums secured. .. and the sale of the property."
UCCU sent a letter dated May 24, 2010 that satisfies the requirements of Paragraph 22 of the
Page 4 of 13
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Deed of Trust. It notified Robertson that he was in default because he failed to occupy the home
within 60 days of executing the Deed of Trust as the Deed of Trust required and because he
"provided false tax returns . . . in connection to his application." The notice advised Robertson
of the action required to cure the default by stating 1) he must occupy the home as his primary
residence and 2) he must either provide documentation verifying that the tax returns he provided
to UCCU were the tax returns he filed with the United States or paying UCCU "all principal,
interest, attorney's fees, costs, interest and applicable fees to date." The notice gave Robertson
until June 24, 2010, 30 days from the date of the notice, to cure the default. Lastly, the notice
provided that "[i]f Mr. Robertson does not cure the default by June 24, 2010, UCCU may
accelerate the debt... and may foreclose upon the property that secures the loan."
Robertson argues that the May 24, 2010 notice was not "legal notice" because it was not
sent to the correct address. Robertson declared that he did not see the notice until UCCU filed
this motion, and the Court will assume this fact is true for purposes of this motion. Although
Robertson did not receive a copy of the notice, the notice was also sent to Robertson's attorney,
Richard D. Bradford. This fulfilled the notice requirement because "an attorney is the agent of
the client and knowledge of any material facts possessed by the attorney is imputed to the
client." Von Hake v.Thomas. 858 P.2d 193,194 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). This is sufficient to
satisfy the notice requirements of the Deed of Trust.
Robertson's Alleged Cure of the Default
Page 5 of
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Robertson argues that he cured his default in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31
by timely making each payment due under the Note. Prior to 1985, UCA. § 57-1-31 provided a
debtor in default with a statutory opportunity to cure the default in a judicial foreclosure.
Washington Nat. Ins. Co. v. Sherwood Associates, 795 P.2d 665, 666 (Utah App. 1990). Since
this section of the Code was amended in 1985, no statutory right to cure remains under this
section if the beneficiary chooses to enforce his or her rights by judicial foreclosure. Id at 666667. Under Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-23, "it is made optional with the beneficiary of the trust
deed whether to foreclose the trust property after a breach of an obligation in a manner provided
for foreclosure of mortgages or to have the trustee proceed under the power of sale provided
therein." Security Title Co. v. Pavless Builders Supply, 407 P.2d 141, 142 (Utah 1965).
Because UCCU chose the option of commencing a judicial mortgage foreclosure action, UCA §
57-1-31 is not applicable to this action. Title 78B, Chapter 6, Part 9 of the Utah Code governs
this action, and it does not provide any statutory method of curing the debtor's default in order to
avoid foreclosure. See UCA §§ 78B-6-901 through 78B-6-909.
Furthermore, Robertson cannot cure his default under the Deed of Trust by simply
remitting payment under the Note because his default stemmed from his misrepresentation to
UCCU during the application process and his failure to occupy the property as his residence
within 60 days of closing. Robertson's default would only be cured if he "fully and timely
performed] his obligations under the agreement." Grossenv. DeWitt 982 P.2d 581, 585 (Utah
Page 6 of 13
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Ct. App. 1999) (holding that defendant did not cure the default by making payment "because the
taxes remained unpaid and the property remained uninsured" as required by the parties'
agreement).
Defendant's Counterclaim
Economic Loss Doctrine (Fifth, Sixth. Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Causes of Action)
U

[A] party suffering only economic loss from the breach of an express or implied

contractual duty may not assert a tort claim for such a breach absent an independent duty of care
under tort law." Hermansen v. Tasulis, 48 P.3d 235, 240 (Utah 2002) (emphasis in original).
Economic loss is defined as:
Damages for inadequate value, costs of repair and replacement of the defective product,
or consequent loss of profits-without any claim of personal injury or damage to other
property . . . as well as the diminution in the value of the product because it is inferior in
quality and does not work for the general purposes for which it was manufactured and
sold.
American Towers Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. CCI Mechanical, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182,1189
(Utah 1996) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Robertson's Counterclaim does not allege personal injury or damage to other property,
but asserts damages properly characterized as an economic loss. UCCU did owe a duty to deal
fairly and honestly with Robertson, but that duty is not independent of the parties' contractual
relationship. A lender has no duty to "specifically request tax returns if it is going to sell a loan
to another institution." See Def.'s Mem. in Opp'n to PL's Second Mot. for Summ. J. at 18.
Page 7 of 13

49

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

{

5

Robertson's fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth causes of action are barred by the economic
loss doctrine because UCCU did not owe a duty to Robertson independent of their contractual
relationship. Each of these causes of action is dismissed.
Specific Performance ("First Cause of Action)
This Court ruled in its Memorandum Decision dated December 6, 2010 that "Robertson
is in default under the Deed of Trust because he provided materially misleading information
during the loan application process and because he has failed to occupy the property within 60
days of closing." Mem. Decision at 8. Robertson's specific performance cause of action to
enforce the contract is rendered moot because of Robertson's default under the Deed of Trust,
and is therefore dismissed.
Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing f Second Cause of Action)
Robertson asserts that UCCU breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing by accelerating the Note without providing Robertson with notice of his right to cure.
As this Court established, UCCU provided Robertson with proper notice, and Robertson failed to
cure the default. Furthermore, in seeking equitable relief, Robertson himself must act in good
faith. Hone v. Hone. 95 P.3d 1221, 1223 (Utah App. 2004).
Robertson did not act in good faith because "he provided materially misleading
information during the loan application process and because he... failed to occupy the property
within 60 days of closing." Mem. Decision dated Dec. 6,2010 at 8. UCCU acted in good faith
Page 8 of 13
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when it initiated foreclosure proceedings against Robertson because it had determined that
Robertson was in default under the Deed of Trust after consulting with Robertson about the
alleged tax returns that Robertson provided. UCCU properly provided notice, and Robertson did
not properly cure his default by continuing to make payments to UCCU. By accepting
Robertson's payments, UCCU did not waive Robertson's breach. The Deed of Trust expressly
provides that "[a]ny forbearance by Lender in exercising any right or remedy... shall not be a
waiver of or preclude the exercise of any right or remedy." ^ 12. Consequently, this Court finds
that because UCCU did not breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, this cause
of action is dismissed.
Declaratory Relief (Third Cause of Action)
Robertson's request for a judicial determination of his rights and duties is rendered moot
because this Court held Robertson to be in default of the contract. Mem. Decision dated Dec. 6,
2010 at 8. Because Robertson defaulted by providing misleading information to UCCU, he is
not entitled to pay less than the full amount of the Note. Robertson's cause of action for
declaratory relief is dismissed as moot.
Breach of Contract (Fourth Cause of Action)
UCCU did not breach the contract by seeking a judicial foreclosure because Robertson
was in default. Mem. Decision dated Dec. 6, 2010 at 8. UCCU was entitled to seek legal redress
upon Robertson's default. Therefore, Robertson's cause of action for breach of contract is
Page 9 of 13
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dismissed.
Promissory Estoppel (Tenth Cause of Action)
The doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable when enforcement of a promise is the
only way to avoid injustice. Hess v. Johnston, 163 P.3d 747, 754 (Utah App. 2007). In order to
prevail in a promissory estoppel claim, Robertson must demonstrate the following four elements:
(1) [Robertson] acted with prudence and in reasonable reliance on
a promise made by [UCCUJ; (2) [UCCU] knew that [Robertson]
relied on the promise which [UCCU] should reasonably expect to
induce action or forbearance on the part of [Robertson] or a third
person; (3) [UCCU] was aware of all material facts; and (4)
[Robertson] relied on the promise and the reliance resulted in a
loss to [him].
Id (quoting Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 158 P.3d 1088 (Utah 2007)).
Robertson has demonstrated that he did not act with prudence and could not have
reasonably relied on a statement from UCCU that his paperwork was in order because Robertson
had actual knowledge that the paperwork he provided to UCCU contained material
misrepresentations about hisfinancialstatus. Furthermore, at the time Robertson submitted
thesefinancialdocuments, UCCU was not aware of the material fact that the financial
documents were not what Robertson purported them to be. Robertson has not proved a valid
claim of promissory estoppel, and his tenth cause of action is therefore dismissed.
Attorney's Fees and Costs
UCCU requests that Robertson pay all of its attorney's fees and costs, which totaled
Page 10 of 13
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$20,409.72 as of the date UCCU filed its reply. When a plaintiff to a foreclosure action requests
attorney's fees, the Court sets the amount of attorney's fees that should be paid. UCA § 78B-6908 (2010). The fee must be reasonable under all the facts and circumstances as well as the
evidence in the record. Associated Indus. Developments, Inc. v. Jewkes, 701 P.2d 486, 488
(Utah 1984) (citing Jensen v. Lichenstein, 45 Utah 320 (1914)).
Counsel for UCCU charges an hourly rate of $200.00 per hour. This is a reasonable
hourly rate in light of the rates charged by attorneys in the area. Robertson has not prevailed on
any issue set forth in his counterclaim. Furthermore, given Robertson's intentional
misrepresentation to UCCU, which fueled the judicial foreclosure process, an award of
attorney's fees is appropriate in this matter. Robertson's argument that UCCU is not entitled to
attorney's fees because Robertson never received notice under the requirements of paragraph 22
of the Deed of Trust fails because this Court holds that he received valid notice through his
attorney. Under the circumstances of this case, UCCU is entitled to Ml payment of their
attorney's fees in the amount of $20,409.72. .
Conclusion
Robertson defaulted by providing false or misleading information during the loan
application process which was specifically intended to mislead the lender. Moreover, he failed
to personally occupy the premises as agreed. The loan was properly accelerated and Robertson
failed to cure the default by repaying the note as agreed. Attorney fees and costs are the liability
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of Robertson under the terms of the note and the amounts claimed by counsel for UCCU are
reasonable and appropriate. As a matter of law, the counterclaims asserted by Robertson cannot
be sustained. The motion for summary judgment is granted. Counsel for UCCU should prepare
an appropriate order pursuant to Rule 7, URCP.
Dated this

1^4&M>£MZV72011

A certificate of mailing is on the following page.
*'^o

Page 12 of 13
54
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(

t

Utah Community Credit Union v. Robertson 100402192 Memorandum Decision 5/

111

Copies of this Order mailed to:
Counsel for Plaintiff:
James "Tucker" Hansen
Paul D. Jarvis
Hansen, Wright, Eddy & Haws
233 South Pleasant Grove Blvd., Suite 202
Pleasant Grove, UT 84062
Counsel for Defendant:
Richard D.Bradford
Bradford Buhler & Lind
389 North University Avenue
Provo,UT 84601

Mailed this

Y
k.

day o r - - — V ^ ^ — • . 2011, postage pre-paid as noted above.

Court Clerk V

Page 13 of 13

55

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

